The Foundational Economy as a Cornerstone for a Social–Ecological Transformation by Bärnthaler, Richard et al.
sustainability
Article
The Foundational Economy as a Cornerstone for a
Social–Ecological Transformation
Richard Bärnthaler 1,* , Andreas Novy 1 and Leonhard Plank 2


Citation: Bärnthaler, R.; Novy, A.;
Plank, L. The Foundational Economy
as a Cornerstone for a
Social–Ecological Transformation.
Sustainability 2021, 13, 10460.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su131810460
Academic Editors: Antonio Boggia
and Anna Mazzi
Received: 17 June 2021
Accepted: 16 September 2021
Published: 20 September 2021
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affil-
iations.
Copyright: © 2021 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
1 Department of Socioeconomics, Institute for Multi-Level Governance and Development, Vienna University of
Economics and Business, Welthandelsplatz 1/D4, 1020 Vienna, Austria; andreas.novy@wu.ac.at
2 Department of Spatial Planning, Centre of Public Finance and Infrastructure Policy, Technical University of
Vienna, Resselgasse 5/2/3, 1040 Vienna, Austria; leonhard.plank@tuwien.ac.at
* Correspondence: richard.baernthaler@wu.ac.at
Abstract: This theoretical paper synthesises research on the foundational economy and its contri-
bution to a social–ecological transformation. While foundational thinking offers rich concepts and
policies to transition towards such transformation, it fails to grasp the systematic non-sustainability
of capitalism. This weakness can be overcome by enriching contemporary foundational thinking
with feminist and ecological economics. Whereas the feminist critique problematises foundational
thinking’s focus on paid labour, the ecological critique targets Sen’s capability approach as a key
inspiration of foundational thinking, arguing that a theory of human needs is better suited to con-
ceptualise wellbeing within planetary boundaries. Based on this, we outline a novel schema of
economic zones and discuss their differentiated contributions to the satisfaction of human needs. By
privileging need satisfaction, such broadened foundational thinking demotes the tradable sector and
rentier economy, thereby revaluating unpaid work as well as respecting ecological imperatives. This
empowers new articulations of social and ecological struggles to improve living conditions in the
short run, while having the potential in the long run to undermine capitalism from within.
Keywords: foundational economy; feminist economics; ecological economics; social–ecological
transformation; social reproduction; planetary boundaries; consumption corridors; provisioning;
human needs; wellbeing
1. Introduction
Since its 2013 Manifesto for the foundational economy [1], the Foundational Economy
Collective (FEC), a group of (mainly) European researchers, has challenged mainstream
thinking about the character of our economy as well as economic policy making. Drawing
upon the work of Fernand Braudel [2,3], the FEC argues for an understanding of the
economy as composed of different zones, with the foundational economy vital for our
everyday life. This includes inter alia provision of electricity and water, garbage disposal,
food supply, education, health, care, social housing, and police. These activities constitute
capitalism’s non-capitalist foundation, the “everyday communism” that sustains and
enables it (Streeck, foreword in [4]).
In this article, we distinguish between the foundational economy as an empirical
reality (henceforth: foundational economy) and foundational thinking as a specific thought-
style disseminated by the Foundational Economy Collective (henceforth: FEC) as a thought
collective. (For the notions of thought collective and thought styles, see [5].) Our goal is
to discuss the potential of foundational thinking for a social–ecological transformation,
defined as a comprehensive change of society-nature relations in the 21st century, enabling a
good life for all within planetary boundaries. We argue that the ability to shape such desired
changes hinges on comprehending the systematic non-sustainability of capitalism, deriving
from how it subordinates use value to exchange value, thereby organising the economy
around profit and not the satisfaction of human needs (the profit imperative); and the way
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that capital, as “self-expanding value” [6] (p. 334), forces capitalist producers to strive
for growth to out-compete others (the accumulation imperative). Although accumulation
does not necessarily mean increasing resource use and emissions, decoupling capitalist
growth from resource use has hardly been achieved [7]. Accumulation continues to be
linked to expansionary dynamics, which are the key drivers of human-made planetary
disasters. Therefore, transformative ways of thinking must engage with these social–
ecological contradictions, as they lead not only to a crisis-prone mode of production, but
make capitalism inherently self-destructive, especially by eroding social reproduction and
transgressing planetary boundaries.
Whereas the foundational economy provides the inputs and values on which capital
accumulation depends—and is thus part and parcel of capitalist society—it simultaneously
has a character and weight of its own, for it represents a proper economic zone with a
specific logic of operation that provides existential goods and services. As in all other
social orders, the foundational economy enables everyday life and human flourishing in
capitalism. This makes it a privileged entry point to transition towards a desired social–
ecological transformation. In the short run, strengthening the foundational economy
is not only possible here and now, i.e., within capitalism, but also highly popular, as
it immediately improves living conditions: better care facilities, better public transport
or nearby leisure facilities. At the same time, empowering the foundational economy
strengthens economic principles other than market exchange and has the potential to invert
capitalism’s structural hierarchy that subordinates social reproduction and ecological
imperatives to profit and capital accumulation. Hence, in the long run, it also offers
pathways to undermining capitalism from within.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a narrative literature review on
foundational thinking, tracing its developments from the past to the present. Section 3 con-
ceptualises capitalism’s social as well as ecological contradictions, and Section 4 evaluates
achievements and shortcomings of foundational thinking in dealing with those contra-
dictions. Section 5 explores the potential of foundational thinking for social–ecological
transformation. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature Review: The Genesis and Development of Foundational Thinking
In 2013, the Manifesto for the foundational economy offered a conceptual toolkit to think
about the foundational economy as a “new economic entity” [1] (p. 3). By focusing on a
mostly unglamorous economic zone that produces and distributes “goods and services con-
sumed by all (regardless of income and status) because they support everyday life” [1] (p. 7),
the manifesto made the plural character of contemporary economy visible. Therefore, it
argued, policy priorities should shift from high-technology tradable sectors that employ
few towards the “foundational economy” that employs around 40% of the workforce in
European countries—a workforce that is almost entirely locally and regionally anchored
and operates “in more or less sheltered areas of economic activity” [1] (p. 7). The mani-
festo criticised business models based on privatisation, public austerity, financialisation,
and short-termist point-value logics, which underestimate temporally and spatially dis-
tant costs and benefits. An adequate business model of the foundational economy must
take up societal obligations in return for the privilege “to extract cash from a territory in
sheltered sectors, rather than expecting sweeteners to operate locally” [1] (p. 18). Hence,
apprehending the foundational economy as embedded in, enabled by, and protected
through political territory, the manifesto highlights the necessity for social franchises
to balance the relations between consumers, workers, and local residents in the provi-
sion of mundane goods and services. These ideas have been refined and further devel-
oped in a series of working papers, public interest reports, journal articles, and books
(cf. https://foundationaleconomy.com/ accessed on 15 August 2021).
A milestone in foundational thinking was the systematisation of economic zones
in the 2018 book Foundational Economy, which was further refined in later publications
(e.g., [8,9]): (1) the core economy (family and community) constitutes a form of provisioning
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outside market-exchange and public provisioning because “we must love one another
and die” [9] (p. 3). Austerity policies have increasingly shifted work to this economic
zone of everyday life, though often under the pretext of volunteering. (2) The foundational
economy is composed of (a) provisioning systems for material services, operating through
“pipes and cables, networks and branches which continuously connect households to daily
essentials—like water, electricity, retail banking and food” [4] (p. 20) and (b) provisioning
systems for providential services such as health and care, education, and social housing.
Both are essential for human flourishing but take culturally and historically specific forms.
They differ from the tradable sector by offering low risk, low return economic activities
with long-term horizons. Since the 1980s, foundational provisioning has been increasingly
privatised or outsourced to not-for-profit organisations, spreading financialised business
models [10,11] and downgrading social obligations. (3) The overlooked economy of “lifestyle
and comfort support systems” [4] (p. 28) includes mundane cultural necessities (e.g., hair-
cuts, holidays, bars, restaurants, gyms) where purchase can be postponed and occurs on an
occasional basis. (4) The tradable and competitive economy, including (aspirational) private
purchases (e.g., cars, electronics), has been at the centre of economic policies, promoting
“business-friendly” structural reforms and “asset-based” welfare strategies, also known as
‘privatised Keynesianism”.
Today, re-orienting public policies towards the foundational economy is a challenge,
due to the restricted public budgets and degraded capacities of public administrations [12].
Affordable and high-quality provisioning of foundational services is a public task but
does not require service delivery by the central state; intermediary institutions, such
as housing associations and water cooperatives, and “coalitions of local and regional
actors” [4] (p. 153) will be more sensitive to local contexts and citizens’ needs. Besides
public provisioning, social licensing can impose social obligations upon private founda-
tional service providers [13]. Such obligations include ecological considerations, working
conditions and wages, treatment of suppliers, reinvestment of limited profits into socially
relevant spheres, and ending tax abuse. As foundational providers have in effect “a territo-
rial franchise through their networks and branches”, they should, “quid pro quo”, offer
“something social in return” [14] (p. 9).
Since metrics drive policy making, foundational thinking seeks alternatives to GVA/GDP
frames, which are biased towards individual market income, impose a unitary identity
upon regions and economic zones, and fallaciously assume that higher productivity solves
low-wage problems. Foundational frames of liveability overcome these shortcomings and
recognise diversity and unevenness in wellbeing [8]. Residual income is a preferred alter-
native metric, measured as post-tax disposable household income minus the inescapable
costs of household essentials such as utilities, housing, and transport [15]. It strikes a
balance between market-income-based private consumption and infrastructure-based col-
lective consumption and reframes differences between and within cities and regions across
four dimensions. First, housing costs vary substantially between different tenure groups
(e.g., social renters, private renters, owners, mortgage payers), thereby taking differenti-
ated slices out of post-tax income. Second, residual income acknowledges households as
units of consumption, pooling income rather than individualising consumption. Third, it
balances between basic service provisioning and income available for overlooked services
such as restaurants or hairdressers, thereby rejecting “either-or” dichotomies in favour of
“as-well-as” thinking. Lastly, it problematises what constitutes a winning region, as success
in terms of GVA/GDP does not deliver liveability if housing, transport, or utility costs are
disproportionately high. Better metrics alone are, however, insufficient. To make sense of
what really matters to citizens, metrics and indicators (techne) must be enriched by local,
specific, and granular knowledge (metis) to understand peculiar social fabrics and inquire
into what people collectively value in their communities, e.g., social infrastructure such
as libraries or parks [16]. Therefore, new democratic devices, such as citizen juries and
assemblies, help to make sense of what citizens, rather than experts, value [4].
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The most recent advancement of foundational thinking happened with respect to
social–ecological transformation. The FEC proposed a shift from foundational thinking
1.0, “which focuses on meeting social needs without explicit concern for the environment”,
towards foundational thinking 2.0, “which relocates the foundational project within the en-
vironmental limits” [17] (p. 3). In this sense, the foundational economy is re-conceptualised
as “an assemblage of reliance systems specific to time and place which . . . collectively
secure the well-being of current and future generations” [17] (p. 17), avoiding the trans-
gression of planetary boundaries. This is today’s key challenge, because “some (but not all)
foundational activities are environmentally burdensome” [17] (p. 7). Foundational thinking
2.0 seeks, first, to extend low-carbon services such as education, health, and care [17] (p. 8).
Second, it aims at “cleaning-up” the high-carbon foundational sectors of food, mobility,
and housing, which inter alia “means diet reform, housing decarb, zero-emission cars and
fewer cars” [17] (p. 9). Third, it proposes “new kinds of foundational systems designed
intentionally to promote low-carbon material substitution, tackle carbon sequestration and
support biodiversity”, e.g., through afforestation [17] (p. 9). (For a report about building a
new resource reliance system, the wood economy, in Wales, see [18].)
3. Conceptual Framework: Two Contradictions Facing a
Social–Ecological Transformation
In this section, we explore the implications of capitalism’s systematic non-sustainability,
particularly capital’s self-destructive tendencies, by drawing upon Nancy Fraser’s [19]
expanded Polanyian-Marxist understanding of capitalism. Fraser conceptualises capitalism
as an “institutionalised social order” [20] (p. 66) that encompasses not only capitalism’s
core productive dynamics but also their conditions of possibility, i.e., capitalism’s repro-
ductive background conditions. Hence, our analytical focus lies on the necessary opposite
to capital accumulation: the contradictory social and ecological “conditions of capitalist
production” [21] (p. 16).
Social contradictions in capitalist reproduction encompass the gendered division be-
tween commodity production and social reproduction, relegating the latter to the private,
domestic sphere, thereby obscuring its social importance and structurally subordinating
those who supply the necessary preconditions for waged labour to those who themselves
earn cash wages [20] (p. 62). Hence, whereas capital accumulation depends on social
reproduction, it tends to erode it, generating gendered precariousness as well as relations
of dependency and exploitation, to the detriment of those working outside the circuit
of commodity production. Mainstream economic theory, by framing the “economic” as
“productive” and the “non-economic” as “unproductive”, creates a hierarchy of economic
zones, which is at the centre of capitalism’s systematic non-sustainability. Ecological con-
tradictions designate the costless annexation of nature, both as input and sink, which
increasingly causes ecological cataclysm, although functioning ecosystems are a precondi-
tion not only for a good life, but for capital accumulation as well. Potentially transformative
ways of thinking must therefore problematise these contradictions, which are inherent in
crisis-prone capitalism and incite different forms of social and political struggles.
Problematising these contradictions, however, is structurally impeded in capitalist soci-
eties, as matters defined as “economic” tend to be expelled from political agendas [20] (p. 67)
separating polity and socio-economy. To pretend that not only the capitalist economy but
also its enabling background conditions have nothing to do with politics is one of “the
most effective defence mechanism(s) available to capital” [22] (p. 67), as it delegitimises
democratic agency, while big business is able to capture political regulations [23]. It frames
precarious and exploitative relations of social reproduction as private, and unsustainable
society–nature relations as the result of individual lifestyle choices or technocratic solutions.
Providing sustainable energy or mobility systems thus becomes a merely individual and
technical issue, restraining the political space to collectively shape social–ecological transfor-
mation. Therefore, transformative ways of thinking must acknowledge that economies are
always cultural political economies [24] and problematise the privatisation and individual-
isation of capitalism’s enabling conditions, as this deprives a polity of deciding collectively
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how and what to produce, how to shape society–nature relations, and how to organise
social reproductive work as well as its relations to production. As such, transformative
ways of thinking require open democratic spaces that enable the political articulation of
capitalism’s social and ecological contradictions. For Laclau and Mouffe [25] (pp. 137–138),
progressive political articulation can reframe hitherto naturalised relations of subordi-
nation as oppressive and susceptible to change, thereby encouraging collective action.
In what follows, we discuss foundational thinking’s achievements and shortcomings in
problematising capitalism’s contradictions.
4. Insights on Foundational Thinking’s Engagement with Capitalism’s Contradictions
4.1. Social Reproduction and Time-Politics: Reframing the Core Economy as Part of the
Foundations of a Good Life
Separating production from reproduction obscures the decisive importance of unpaid
reproductive work, often invisible, executed outside the circuit of commodity production
and performed according to different logics of time and in non-wage social relations [26,27].
Activities of social reproduction sustain everyday life in any social order as well as capital
accumulation in a capitalist social order. However, whereas capitalism depends on this
reproductive sphere, it induces reproductive crises through shifting care tasks from richer
to poorer families within and between countries [28], and externalising care work on to
cheaper migrant workers who face highly precarious working conditions and lack of basic
citizenship rights, including insecure residence authorisations. This precariousness has
been demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Foundational thinking offers political strategies to address this contradiction. First, it
proposes to shift the focus of economic policies from high-technology and tradable sectors
towards foundational goods and services which also “provide the infrastructure for the
production and reproduction of global capital” [29] (p. 315). As such, it acknowledges
that “labour power . . . is not simply replenished at home” [30] (n.p.) (cf. also [31]),
but needs healthcare, education, housing and other social infrastructures that strengthen
communities and enable recreation [16,32]. Second, it problematises the intrusion of
capitalist logics (e.g., in the form of extractive business models) into foundational sectors.
This has not only exacerbated exploitation of paid care workers but also appropriated the
work of unpaid caregivers, increasing work burdens and thus time stress, particularly
among women, and further worsening working conditions in professional care. Third,
foundational thinking offers promising ways to lessen the highly unequal distribution
of care burdens on the unpaid and underpaid domains of society by promoting high-
quality and accessible foundational services, produced under good working conditions.
In this regard, the policy framework of universal basic services (UBS) [33] is a close ally
to foundational thinking, shifting “the focus from transfers to public services” [34] (p. 1).
UBS scholars stress that sustainable social reproduction depends on the fulfilment of
shared human needs, which can be realised via universal access to collectively provided
services [34,35]. Furthermore, foundational thinking and UBS make a strong case for
guaranteeing access to affordable and high-quality universal basic services provided via the
foundational economy. This constitutes a form of social citizenship not only for those who
have the proper nationality or are entitled to vote, but for all those inhabiting and working
within a certain territory, thereby improving the often-precarious civic rights, including
residence conditions, of (migrant) workers in general, and care-workers in particular.
Hence, foundational thinking ignites vital debates about social reproduction. There-
fore, it challenges the neoclassical market-price theory of value, which assumes that indi-
vidual consumer preferences determine demand and, as a result, price. Since price, in this
view, is further equated with value, the latter is reduced to exchange value. Foundational
thinking, on the contrary, is about social use values, and therefore problematises which
activities contribute to human flourishing and which hinder it [36].
However, the potential for collective action resultant from foundational thinking
remains limited, if unpaid work and its subordination to paid labour are not adequately
grasped and conceptualised. Residual household income as an alternative metric for
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wellbeing illustrates this shortcoming. Although measured at the household level, it
obscures the core economy of self-organised caring, often occurring within households.
Residual income, therefore, masks the uneven distribution of unpaid work within the
household, which is at the root of gender inequality.
Marx declared of the “economy of time” [37] (p. 173) that “to this all economy ul-
timately reduces itself”. Unpaid activities—ranging from household upkeep and care
work to unpaid voluntary services—comprise more than 40% of total work time, with
three-quarters of that attributed to women and one quarter to men [38,39]. Adequate
metrics of time use must thus complement residual income to make unpaid work visible,
measuring time spent on activities that enable everyday life and human flourishing. Regu-
lar time-use surveys provide important insights for progressive political articulations of
this contradiction in term of time politics.
For example, Frigga Haug’s [26,27] “Four-in-One Perspective” articulates a political
vision for an equitable distribution of socially necessary work. Her synthesis of decades
of feminist–Marxist research puts work at centre stage by proposing a fair partitioning
of the working day into four activities of equal length (four hours each per day with the
remainder reserved for sleep): (1) Remunerated work in exchange for individual income,
which can occur in all economic zones, except the core economy, and is currently pre-
dominantly performed by men; (2) Reproductive work, which occurs in both the unpaid
core economy and the paid providential foundational economy, and is mainly performed
by women who face the double burden of being both paid caregivers and fulfilling most
unpaid care work [40] (p. 40); (3) Cultural work, as a precondition for self-development,
includes lifelong learning to develop one’s own ideas about vita activa [41], an active and
flourishing life: “It should no longer be accepted that some speak four languages, dance,
make music, write poetry, paint and travel to hone themselves, while others have to be
happy if they can read and write at all. The point is that all people have the potential to
develop” [26] (p. 34, our translation); (4) Political work enables the shaping of society, as
well as one’s neighbourhood, workplace, school, or university, including new democratic
devices for participation to shape foundational provisioning. While Haug’s “Four-in-One
Perspective” calls for reducing remunerated work, it acknowledges that “we have not too
little, but too much work” [26] (p. 72, our translation), from caregiving and ‘care of the self’
to political participation. However, with a highly unequal distribution of different forms
of work, and thus of time, comes a highly unequal distribution of precariousness, social
burdens, potential for self-development, and possibilities for political self-determination.
This leads to a broader conception of wellbeing that not only balances market income
and collective infrastructures, but also includes the equal distribution of different forms of
work. It problematises the varieties of unpaid forms of work and thus time. In capitalism,
work is separated from other activities of life—which, following Polanyi [42] (p. 171), is
constitutive of labour’s subjection “to the laws of the market”, thereby annihilating “all
organic forms of existence” and replacing “them by a different type of organization, an
atomistic and individualistic one”—and unpaid work is subordinated to those activities
that generate market income. Enlarging the concept of work, however, has the potential
to articulate new social struggles to undermine the dominant hierarchy, that prioritises
production (in the sense of producing exchange values) over reproduction (in the sense of
sustaining the potential to be productive).
4.2. Ecology and the Reframing of Wellbeing: Provisioning for Human Needs in a Safe and
Just Space
While capital has been a key driver of social progress in material aspects and of
expanding individual freedoms over the last two centuries, it has caused uneven develop-
ment, increased social inequalities, and trespassed ecological limits [43]. This has resulted
in a dramatic ecological overshoot with regard to climate change, biodiversity loss, and
land use, as well as nitrogen and phosphorus loading [44].
Therefore, capitalism’s second contradiction concerns ecology, i.e., our “external
physical conditions” [45] (p. 562). These are often “bought and sold and utilized as if
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they were commodities” [21] (p. 23), turning nature into a “fictitious commodity” [42],
while at the same taking a human-friendly climate for granted. Assuming this, however,
is an illusion, as all that seems solid can melt due to unrestrained capitalist growth that
results from “a positive re-enforcing feedback loop that inevitably leads to planetary
overshoot, if nothing is done to break it” [46] (p. 11). This makes apparently productive
and efficient capital “a problem-generating structure” [46] (p. 11), impairing not only the
basic conditions that sustain human life on Earth, but also its own preconditions. This
endangers any transition towards socially and ecologically sustainable economies. Such
transitions lack role models or best practices, as no country currently occupies a “safe and
just space” [47,48], i.e., a space that is characterized by neither ecological overshoot nor a
deficit in the satisfaction of human needs [49,50].
The shift from foundational thinking 1.0 to foundational thinking 2.0 enriches strate-
gies for a social–ecological transformation. First, foundational thinking’s substantive
metrics of liveability escape the dogma of compulsory economic growth as the ultimate
yardstick of policy making. As such, it is consistent with proponents of a-growth [51].
Foundational thinking does not reject economic growth per se, but considers mere GDP
increase a misleading indicator of wellbeing, and therefore calls for a more sustainable
policy paradigm. Second, foundational thinking urges the rebuilding of public adminis-
trative capacities to tackle collective challenges, such as climate change, which connects
well with innovative policy proposals for the re-municipalisation of existential provision-
ing, which provides public services (e.g., services of general interest in EU jargon) [52],
the European Green Deal, and other eco-reformist plans (e.g., [53]). Third, foundational
thinking at the same time maintains undogmatic and context-sensitive principles, as re-
liance systems are “specific to time and place” and therefore require “different forms of
intervention” [17] (pp. 17, 22) (cf. also [54]). This is consistent with the more comprehen-
sive system of provision approach (SoP) [55], that denotes an interdisciplinary framework
to, inter alia, identify “how resource use is impacted by a very specific system of provision
in each place and time” [56] (p. 5). Therefore, “no ‘optimal’ System of Provision” exists and
“sustainability solutions require close attention to material culture in each case” [56] (p. 5).
Finally, foundational thinking does not join “techno optimists” [17] (p. 8), but instead
stresses the need for “social change” (e.g., diet reform, fewer cars) to accompany technolog-
ical innovations. The question of how to achieve such change, however, reveals potential
inconsistencies in foundational thinking 2.0 and associated limits in politically articulating
ecological contradictions.
Whereas the FEC acknowledges that “choices of human subjects are inconsistent and
judgments depend on the framing of choice” [4] (pp. 91, 129) and criticises how “environ-
mental responsibility is too often represented as a puritan individual consumption choice”,
it consistently rejects “intrusive measures” and privileges “choice” over “prohibition”, e.g.,
in substituting energy-intensive activities [17] (p. 8). What is needed, the FEC [4] argues, is
not “a template of objectives” (p. 155), but simply to ask citizens what they want (p. 130).
Foundational citizenship, Calafati et al. [17] (p. 15) continue, is about “active choice and
voice, not a list of entitlements”.
This line of reasoning is based on Sen’s [57] capability approach (CA) (cf. [4,58]). Sen
problematises utility conceptions of wellbeing, arguing that levels of goods consumption
must not serve as a measure of wellbeing, as commodities are only a means to an end.
Instead, wellbeing must be judged in terms of ends, i.e., by the kind of life that a person is
able to live. Sen defines wellbeing in terms of opportunities and freedoms for individuals,
i.e., capabilities, which in turn rest on people’s functionings, i.e., “what she or he manages
to do or to be” [59] (p. 12). Sen famously rejects listing universal functionings, as the FEC
rejects listing entitlements. Therefore, a person’s capabilities “represent all the combinations
of functionings that are feasible to that person—that she could choose. The larger the set of
choices, the greater the level of wellbeing” [60] (p. 41). Although criticising consumerism
and the neoclassical concept of utility, Sen’s CA remains “preference-based” [61] (p. 308).
Sen [62] (p. 508) articulates his reliance on preference theory explicitly. As such, it does not
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provide a “means for identifying basic functionings or capabilities common to a group of
people, let alone to all people” [60] (p. 41). Thus, contrary to what the FEC [4] (pp. 90, 99)
claims, CA can neither identify “an irreducible core to foundational provision that is
detachable from local territorial choices”, nor extend the meaning of citizenship to become
“part of the very essence of being human and social”.
Once planetary boundaries require societal boundaries [63], CA leads to impasse.
As CA views people’s freedom of choice, whether living today or in the future, as its
immovable standard, it “does not prescribe a certain type of life for either the current
or future generations and in consequence does not schedule sustaining a certain state of
the world” [64] (p. 58). This offers only “a very thin protection for future generations
in a current world where present actions are wreaking environmental devastation and
unconstrained consumption of natural resources” [65] (p. 1211). Exnovating, recompos-
ing, constraining, and ending certain forms of provisioning (e.g., combustion engines)
are prerequisites to tackle the ecological crisis. Freedom of individual choice in consum-
ing goods and services will not achieve this; only political decisions on restructuring
complete provisioning systems will [55,66]. The latter is also in accordance with the
FEC’s [4] (p. 130) own reasoning, arguing that taking “environmental responsibility seri-
ously” presupposes redesigning the systems that underpin social consumption. However,
their reliance on Sen’s CA provides an insufficient answer to questions over what grounds
such redesigning would occur. Relying on citizens’ consumer preferences and avoiding
limits on individuals’ choices fails to make sense of the “systematic mechanism by which
habitual, social or cultural phenomena would influence preferences” [61] (pp. 308–309).
This legitimises problematic concepts such as “authentic preferences” and “agency without
structure” [61] (pp. 308–309).
In contrast to CA, human need theory [67] offers moral justifications and, accordingly,
the analytical underpinning for such decisions. It identifies needs that unite us as human
beings: health, autonomy, and social participation. Those human needs are grounded in
objective psychological and physiological requirements. They are plural (because they are
not summable), non-substitutional (since they cannot be traded off against others), satiable,
and cross-generational (they remain consistent across generations) [60] (pp. 45–46). Above
all, they are universal, because if they are not satisfied “then serious harm of some objec-
tive kind will result”, implying “obstacles to successful social participation” [60] (p. 42).
Nevertheless, despite their universality, human needs can be satisfied in different ways,
which vary across space-time and cultures. This refers to Max-Neef’s [68] “need satisfiers”,
which can take a great variety of forms, but differ from capabilities or functionings in that
need satisfiers are explicitly linked (and linkable) to universal human needs [35].
Human need theory, replacing the understanding of wellbeing as an increasing set of
choices by limited and objective human needs, offers pathways for a progressive political
articulation of wellbeing within planetary boundaries. It highlights that how needs are
satisfied affects other people’s possibilities to satisfy their needs, today and in the future.
As such, it makes “moral demands on agents that preferences do not” [69], thereby demon-
strating the inevitability of collective duties and obligations [65] (p. 1206). Hence, need
satisfaction cannot be reduced to an individual’s free choice, let alone to an ever-increasing
set of choices; it is a political question, integral to organising a polity in a sustainable
way. “Thus, similar to the feminist politicisation of family life, which was long perceived
as archetypically belonging to the private sphere, politicising (private) everyday life, in-
cluding its societal and planetary implications, is certainly crucial to pursuits of more
sustainable nature-society relations” [70] (p. 9). Such politicisation of ‘private’ everyday
life articulates ecological contradictions in new ways. Hence, “asking citizens what they
want” [4] (pp. 130–131, emphasis added) is insufficient for a social–ecological transforma-
tion. It settles responsibility for climate action on the individual, thereby construing the
persistence of non-sustainable provision of goods and services as morally wrong individual
choices. This has to be problematised, as collective needs, not individual wants or pref-
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erences, must take priority in transforming provision systems. This has implications for
democratic empowerment, to which we now turn.
5. Discussion: Foundational Thinking for a Social–Ecological Transformation
5.1. Democracy and Collective Empowerment in the Era of Social–Ecological Transformation
Foundational thinking is committed to democratic decision making and the col-
lective empowerment of citizens. It interprets this objective consistent with CA. The
FEC [4] (p. 130) proposes a shift from “top-down agendas” towards “simply asking cit-
izens about their foundational priorities”. However, consider this: the FEC has cited a
UK national survey from Populus showing that respondents gave top priority to essential
services and utilities—which is certainly reassuring—but what if armed forces had ranked
higher than food and water? Should policy makers follow this preference? The same survey
ranked private car ownership above public transport subsidies. Again, should this popular
preference guide policy makers, although it endangers climate goals? The FEC [4] (p. 155)
seems to argue that they should, because only through “surveys and focus groups” can
one “figure out whether public transport is a high priority”. Such reasoning, however,
instigates a vicious circle. It disregards key insights from SoP (e.g., [55,66]), environmental
psychology (e.g., [71]), and practice theory (e.g., [72,73]), all critical of theories “in which
behaviour is taken to be a matter of choice” [72] (p. 141).
Hence, as Hansen [74] (p. 6) recognises, “it is perhaps not ‘blindingly obvious’ that
foundational priorities should be established by ‘asking citizens what they want’. However,
taking environmental sustainability seriously in the foundational economy may require
a more elaborated engagement with processes of priority setting and questions around
hierarchies of needs”. In this sense, designing democratic decision making consistent with
human need theory can improve the quality of democratic policy making in a way that
Sen’s CA cannot [75].
First, human need theory provides a solid theoretical and moral commitment for a
good life for all within planetary boundaries, that can be democratically codified. While
the SDGs share this vision, their lack of a comprehensive theory has resulted in sustainable
development goals that almost entirely target material aspects, thereby omitting vital
components of human wellbeing such as social affiliation, physical security, and critical
autonomy [60] (p. 56). Moreover, not all of them find a parallel in human need theory:
lumping need-related goals together with economic growth is a questionable way to satisfy
them [60] (p. 56). Second, human need theory based on objectives for social–ecological
transformation highlights the necessity for contextualised deliberations on need satisfiers,
beyond merely “asking citizens what they want”. Better engagement with societal priorities
and universal needs presupposes a systematic assessment and comparison of stock-flow-
service outcomes from different provisioning systems and allows for recognising certain
forms of provisioning to be inconsistent with a good life for all within planetary boundaries,
and for experimenting with alternatives that provide these services with fewer material
flows [76] (p. 11), thereby enabling distinctions between better and worse need satisfiers.
Car ownership, for example, due to high financial costs, air pollution, accidents, and related
sedentary lifestyle, can affect needs satisfaction negatively [77–79]. It is the art of politics to
take decisions, supported by sufficiently powerful interests, that will enable better need
satisfiers and contest those that do not. Success in such political struggles is not a given, but
it is a decisive democratic task to win the hearts, minds, and votes of citizens—probably
the single most important contribution to a social–ecological transformation. It is essential
to curtail provisioning systems unassociated with human needs (e.g., rent extraction) and
to contest provisioning systems that encourage eco-socially unsustainable need satisfiers
(e.g., car-dependent infrastructures, excessive meat consumption). To clarify the former,
Reinert [75] (pp. 68–69) argues that “while an individual might claim a ‘need’ for tobacco
or cocaine, objective scientific evidence would dispute this and obviate inclusion of these
items”. The same can be said for many other aspects of life: the “need” for a sports car, the
“need” for a retail therapy, the “need” for a new smartphone or a holiday flight every year,
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etc. Although there are certainly grey areas, it is plausible to assume that objective human
needs not only exist but can, in principle, also be distinguished from mere subjective wants.
While the FEC rejects templates of objectives [4] (p. 155) and a constraining central
state [4] (p. 157), it has to be acknowledged that an effective enabling state has to pursue
common objectives via political rule making [80]—and this always implies constraining
certain behaviours with the clear objective of redistributing resource use. To take an
example, 70% of vehicle purchases, 76% of package holidays, and 75% of energy for
air transport are consumed by the world’s top 10% [81]. Being aware of distributional
consequences of constraints leads to different problematisations and, therefore, different
solutions [82]. Focusing on choices, such as Sen does, can systematically sidestep decision
making on these and other important topics.
Hausknost [83] helps to grasp the limits of an understanding of democracy that con-
flates it with the search for consensus and unanimity. He distinguishes three “agentic opera-
tors” that determine “the ways in which societal reality is reproduced and changed”: choice,
solution and decision [83] (p. 358). Choice, at the core of market economies, is performed
in undecidable situations, i.e., in a field of incommensurable alternatives, but does not
eliminate options, thereby producing “aggregate results outside the political system” [83]
(p. 367). Sustainable consumption is an example (e.g., choosing organic coffee). Solution
is the generic operator of science and technology as well as of public administrations. It
eliminates options in decidable situations, i.e., in a field with different but commensurable
alternatives. Based on clear criteria, the best, i.e., most efficient, option is taken, for example,
a decarbonised energy mix. Finally, decision concerns the elimination of options within an
undecidable field of incommensurabilities, selecting “between different political rationali-
ties and world views” [83] (pp. 366–367), such as financing railways rather than motorways.
Contemporary representative mass democracies, Hausknost argues, tend to avoid decisions
and thus depoliticise the path towards transformation. As both choice and administrative
rationality (solution) favour regime stability over transformative potential, empowering
decision making is crucial for creating new forms of provisioning [83] (p. 371). Politics, in
this sense, is about deciding between incommensurabilities in situations of uncertainty.
Constraining is a precondition of enabling and empowering: only by closing doors will
others open. This is called “choice editing”, i.e., an active process of limiting, controlling,
and enabling individual choices to reach common goals. If we aim for a sustainable food
system, politics must decide against intensive animal farming to enable organic arable
farming. If we aim to change mobility habits, politics must discontinue fossil-fuel subsidies,
restrict flights, and redistribute habitation space while investing heavily in public transport.
If we aim to distribute forms of work more equally, politics needs to set absolute floors and
ceilings on waged working hours as well as on wages.
A democratic system willing to take and accept tough decisions must be compromise-
based. Inherent in democracy are collective decisions about collective self-limitation (“you
must not violate private property; you must not drive through traffic lights at red”).
Democratic systems thus entail, by definition, certain limits on individual choices to ensure
social freedom. Hence, democracy does not imply unlimited individual freedom, but
remains a form of domination, albeit the least oppressive. Authority and democracy are
not opposites; on the contrary, the latter cannot exist without the former, because “where
the ‘you ought’ of the social imperative is conditioned by the ‘if and what you want’ of
the addressee, order loses all social meaning” [84] (p. 56, our translation). “Power and
compulsion”, as Polanyi [42] (p. 266) argues in his plea for the conception of freedom in
a complex society, are part of reality. “An ideal that would ban them from society must
be invalid. . . . No society is possible in which power and compulsion are absent, nor a
world in which force has no function” [42] (pp. 266–267). Those who oppose implementing
new limits as oppressive tend to hide the fact that the current eco-social order is based
on prohibitions, limits, and constraints: It is prohibited to use someone else’s property;
the freedom to walk and play is severely limited by road traffic regulations privileging
cars; commodified access to need satisfiers constrains consumption by low-income groups.
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Prohibitions, limits, and constraints are part of any social order. The respective rules are
imposed by means of coercion, not necessarily violent, e.g., private property is protected by
police and courts, those not using a car behave according to road traffic regulation, whether
for children wanting to play or elderly wanting to cross the road. The real political question
is what form prohibitions take and which activities are restricted to enable others. Hence,
social–ecological transformation would simultaneously enable and restrain; it would lift
certain (currently “naturalised”) prohibitions, e.g., with respect to the use of public spaces
that have long been monopolised by car-friendly regulations and with respect to the
affordability of social services, while introducing choice architectures that limit available
options to sustainable ones. The resultant social and political struggle will be at the core of
the social–ecological transformation. Changing unsustainable provisioning systems will
not happen without struggle, as difficult decisions must be taken.
Therefore, our broadened foundational thinking challenges both overly technocratic
forms of bureaucratic provisioning as well as overly enthusiastic pleas for bottom-up
participation. To sum up: experientially grounded knowledge and empowerment of
citizens has to be combined with the acceptance of majority rule, minority rights, and a
strong science-policy nexus. The design of democratic governance is a challenging task
and needs democratically legitimated policy makers willing to take decisions to shape
provisioning systems via political-economic regulations.
This “dual strategy” [60] (p. 93) does not imply paternalistic blueprints, but a political
commitment to “design principles of systemic change” [46] (p. 12), which must then be
translated to local contexts by local actors via citizen participation: Do we want centralised
care centres with highest medical standards or small-scale and decentralised care homes
in the neighbourhood? How can abandoned property in the district be brought to use?
Democratic empowerment for necessary social–ecological transformations delimits the
framework within which cooperative, experimental, and grassroots democratic activity
occurs, but nevertheless allows for diversity in what is desirable within a given framework.
This is compatible with diverse conceptions of a good life within the ‘planetary feasible’ [85].
In what follows, we propose transformational design principles which combine foun-
dational thinking, democratic decision making, and human need theory, and would, as
framework conditions, need to be translated into concrete policies in local contexts through
innovative forms of citizen participation and collective action.
5.2. Design Principles for Social–Ecological Transformation: A Zonal Transition Schema of
Contemporary Economies
Foundational thinking provides a “strategic entry-point” [17] (p. 8) for transition
towards a social–ecological transformation, focusing on extending low-carbon founda-
tional activities, decarbonising others, and exploring new sustainable foundational systems
(cf. Section 2). However, due to a sometimes-limited grasp of capitalism, foundational
thinking tends to underestimate systemic restraints in order to prioritise the foundational
economy in capitalist economies in which the tradable and rentier economy dominates
and social–ecological reproduction is structurally subordinated to commodity production.
To overcome this weakness, combining foundational thinking’s differentiated understand-
ing of economic zones with human need theory allows for conceptualising new forms of
democratic priority setting that create further potential for inverting the capitalist hierarchy
of commodity production over social–ecological reproduction. It nourishes a new con-
ceptual field of possibility for political articulations and associated policy proposals that
distinguish foundational forms of provisioning from others, thereby prioritising objective
human needs, and eliminating where possible unsustainable need satisfiers from choice
architecture [60,77,86,87]. Strengthening the foundational economy is not a simple win–win
policy but has implications for other economic zones. It requires weakening the dominance
of non-foundational economic zones, and thus the capitalist mode of production. Hence,
raising the share of collective, decommodified, and ecologised foundational provision-
ing must be combined with sufficiency strategies, thereby constraining certain forms of
private consumption. (Lacking a better term, we use “ecologise” to explicitly go beyond
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a too narrow focus on decarbonisation. Ecologising provisioning systems includes, but
cannot be reduced to, decarbonisation, since it also addresses other planetary boundaries,
especially biodiversity and land use [44].) Prioritising the foundational economy (and the
core economy, cf. Section 4.1) means curtailing other economic zones which have either
to shrink (if they hardly serve human needs) or be converted (if they enable provision by
means of harmful need satisfiers); that is, they must be consistently treated as adjuncts to
sustainable reliance systems. To orient decision makers, Table 1 outlines a zonal transition
schema of contemporary economies, based on foundational thinking and compatible with
decision-oriented human need theory (This schema is based on preparatory work by [8,40]):
Table 1. Zonal transition schema of contemporary economies.
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Decision is the operator of transformation, “the operator of politics proper, by virtue
of politics being the name of the undecidability of the social” [82] (p. 10). It offers poten-
tials to “transcend capital, rather than feed it” [46] (p. 12), because it allows for political
articulations that contest framing the core economy as private, and wellbeing as individual
choice. This is a precondition for confronting the social and ecological contradictions facing
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social–ecological transformation and resonates with discussions on the (moral) economy
of time (e.g., [26,88,89]) and sustainable consumption corridors (e.g., [90–95]). The zonal
transition schema offers five guiding design principles to tackle social and ecological con-
tradictions by linking social and ecological struggles. These design principles can realise
the potential of the foundational economy for undermining capitalism, as they strategically
invert capitalism’s structural hierarchy: social reproduction and ecological imperatives
would no longer be subordinate to commodity production and profit maximisation. There-
fore, they acknowledge that such inversion cannot be reduced to discursive practices,
but need material manifestations, e.g., in public budgets, subsidies, taxes, and physical
infrastructures. The five principles are:
(1) Problematise the boundary between paid and non-paid work by politicising the
localised unpaid sector, i.e., the core economy, which comprises more than 40% of total
work time, 75% of which is done by women. Adequate metrics, especially time-use
surveys, are a precondition to make the core economy (and its distribution) visible,
and thus to engender political articulations in terms of time-politics. These must
complement residual income and other eco-social indicators of a safe and just space.
Time-politics aims at reducing wage labour, an increasingly popular proposal [96],
and at an equal distribution of different forms of work (remunerated, reproductive,
cultural, and political).
(2) Decommodify (e.g., via UBS as a social guarantee) and ecologise as well as expand
(e.g., via a Green (New) Deal) the collective provisioning systems of the foundational
economy. This means prioritising the satisfaction of human needs and improving
working conditions for key workers in this zone. This requires converting unsustain-
able forms of need satisfaction, e.g., through social licensing and other regulations as
well as prohibition. Substantive forms of citizen participation can support democratic
conflict resolution. This is of special importance for enabling diverse conceptions
of a good life within the “planetary feasible” by shaping the available sustainable
options contextually, such that innovative forms of provisioning (e.g., commoning,
municipalisation, prosuming, sharing) become possible. Together with the core econ-
omy, the foundational economy is the key zone to strengthen resilience in view of
potential and ongoing environmental crises [85] (p. 95). Public funding must thus be
ensured by measures similar to a “golden rule of investment”, low-interest rates for
public investment, eco-sensible regulations by central banks, the establishment of a
European bank for services of general interest, or a public climate bank, as well as a
solidary contribution by high-income earners and wealth owners (especially through
taxing rents and luxury consumption).
(3) Sustain and convert market-based non-essential local provisioning, i.e., the overlooked
economy, which provides comfort goods that are essential for social participation.
Together with the foundational economy, this economic zone encompasses almost
two-thirds of all jobs in Europe [4,40], and invariably sustains social meeting places.
Its decline in rural areas and on the urban periphery leads to social problems and
polarisation. However, non-essential local provisioning is characterised by diverse
business models that range from long-term, locally anchored, and non-financialised
business models (e.g., the local café or restaurant) to those dominated by multina-
tional capital (e.g., Starbucks, McDonalds, parts of the tourism industry). Better
conceptualisation of this rather disparate zone is a prerequisite for effective policies
that strengthen small and medium-sized enterprises, while strictly regulating multi-
national companies, which extract rents from non-essential local provisioning. In this
zone as well, political regulations must aim at converting and restricting unsustain-
able forms of need satisfaction, while promoting sustainable ones (e.g., via restrictions
on advertising holiday air travel and promotion of local leisure activities).
(4) Convert and shrink the export-oriented market economy to strengthen its serving func-
tion, i.e., to treat it as an adjunct to a reliance system. Due to the urgent need for
decarbonisation, transformations in this zone are crucial, as it excessively consumes
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precious resources and emits a disproportionate share of CO2. In other words, wher-
ever something does not serve the satisfaction of human needs—such as luxury
consumption—it must shrink; and wherever something purportedly satisfies human
needs in an unsustainable way, e.g., intensive animal farming or the car industry, it
must be converted. Strategies of selective (re-)regionalisation and deglobalisation
could shorten supply chains and strengthen (macro-)regional economic circuits. At
the same time, producers in the Global South must be supported in establishing
their own regional economic networks, which have often been weakened by export-
oriented policies in the Global North (such as massive agricultural subsidies in the
EU). Furthermore, excessive profits should be curtailed; options might include ex-
tending social licensing beyond the foundational economy to control social surplus
and extending the logic of limited liability for losses to entitlements to profits for
capital companies. (Within such a legal form, the company has no external own-
ers, but simply investors with different risks of loss who receive higher or lower
interest rates, accordingly. Once a deposit including interest has been paid off, there
are no more claims left. Many successful companies (e.g., Zeiss, Saarstahl, Bosch,
ZF Friedrichshafen) already work according to this principle [97]. This legal form
recognises what liberal economists, from Smith to Eucken, repeatedly emphasised
up until the 19th century: namely, that limited liability companies were originally in-
tended for areas of special public interest only.) This would help replace the impatient
capital characteristic of the short-termist point-value logic of financialised capitalism
with more patient, stream–value capital, necessary for strengthening and converting
provisioning systems.
(5) Shrink the rentier economy, i.e., the FIRE sector composed of finance, insurance, and
real estate as well as other quasi-monopolists (e.g., on intellectual property rights).
(The equation of the FIRE sector with value extraction and the rent economy is only
partially applicable. As the example of the Austrian non-profit housing sector shows,
rents can also be extracted within the same sector and fed into a socially useful circuit,
e.g., via social licensing.) This economic zone is based on unearned income and has
led to a dangerous concentration of economic and political power [98] which hollows
out democracies and foundational provisioning and stimulates the consumption of
energy-intensive luxury goods [81,95]. Fanning et al. [56] (p. 8) conceptualise the
rentier economy as an assemblage of “appropriating systems” that, in contrast to
provisioning systems, do not satisfy universal human needs but “extract rents to
satisfy the wants of a small section of society (e.g., a wealthy elite), at the expense
of efficient social provisioning”. The rentier economy, in other words, does not
provide use values but “reduce(s) the resource efficiency of human wellbeing via
rent extraction, and act(s) as a barrier to meeting human needs at a sustainable level
of resource use” [56] (p. 1). Following Mazzucato [99], the rentier economy is the
central “value taker”, appropriating produced values, e.g., via monopoly profits, stock
manipulations or patents. It extracts value via a process of ex- and appropriation,
i.e., what Harvey [100] (p. 75) refers to as “the cutting edge of accumulation by
dispossession in recent times”.
To sum up, impeding the costless appropriation of time and nature, i.e., to confront the
social and ecological contradictions facing social–ecological transformation, requires coor-
dinated political decisions at multiple levels. Considering the lack of role models and best
practices to transition towards a safe and just space, no explored paths, let alone blueprints,
exist. The design principles of a social–ecological transformation proposed here, how-
ever, can serve as a compass, an abstract map that needs to be refined and contextualised,
particularly through transdisciplinary research with extra-scientific local actors.
6. Conclusions
In this article, we have synthesised the current state of foundational thinking and
discussed its potential for social–ecological transformation, i.e., its ability to confront
Sustainability 2021, 13, 10460 15 of 19
capitalism’s social and ecological contradictions that are at the root of its systematic non-
sustainability. Since capitalist social orders structurally tend to exclude matters defined
as “economic” from democratic decision making, they frame these contradictions as non-
political, i.e., private and individual. Hence, transformative ways of thinking, aiming to
engender effective political contestation and collective action, must strive for progressive
political articulations. We have been mindful of this in the discussion of foundational
thinking’s achievements and shortcomings.
Regarding social contradictions, foundational thinking’s quest to shift economic poli-
cies towards the foundational economy, its critique of extractive business models in foun-
dational sectors, and its promotion of decommodified forms of foundational provisioning
are essential elements in problematising capitalism’s ranking of commodity production
above social reproduction. At the same time, foundational thinking has not as yet suf-
ficiently problematised capitalism’s structural subordination of unpaid to paid labour,
thereby reinforcing the privatisation of the former. Residual income as a key indicator of
foundational thinking is a case in point. Hence, opening up the core economy to public
debate and deliberation requires time-use surveys as integral parts of the foundational
metrics of liveability to make the core economy visible, debatable, and contestable. This is
a precondition for emancipatory time politics, which extends the meaning of work (remu-
nerated, reproductive, cultural, and political), reduces remunerated work, and distributes
different forms of work (and thus time) more equally. Crucially, time politics offers key
potential for linking social–reproductive and ecological struggles, liberating “space for a
more equal division of daily caring activities among genders” [101] (p. 160), and poten-
tially reducing unsustainable consumption patterns, especially with regard to food and
transport [102–107].
Regarding ecological contradictions, foundational thinking’s innovative metrics of
liveability, its plea to rebuild administrative public capacities, its focus on context sensitivity,
and its scepticism over techno-optimism are important elements in tackling the collective
challenge of climate change and providing a more nuanced understanding of the social
and contextual nature of planetary boundaries. However, by cleaving to Sen’s capability
approach (CA), foundational thinking has thus far failed to problematise capitalism’s
structural hierarchy of economic zones, because CA’s focus on freedom of choice tends to
depoliticise need satisfaction and wellbeing. Human need theory, by contrast, provides
a basis for progressive political articulations in highlighting that how needs are satisfied
affects other people’s possibilities for need satisfaction, both today and in the future. This
makes democratic governance necessary to shape sustainable forms of provision. In times
of accelerating social–ecological crises, there is a need to adapt democratic institutions
in the light of the required social–ecological transformation, thereby placing the agentic
operator decision centre stage. This implies a dual strategy, linking a strong science-policy
nexus committed to the design principles of a social–ecological transformation with citizen
participation to translate those principles to local contexts. This enables innovative forms
of provisioning and diverse conceptions of a good life within the ‘planetary feasible’.
Finally, linking human need theory and foundational thinking, we have developed a
zonal transition schema for contemporary economies, proposing five potential design prin-
ciples for a social–ecological transformation. Whereas in the short term, strengthening the
foundational and core economy improves immediate living conditions within capitalism,
the transition schema offers long-term potential to invert capitalism’s structural hierarchy
subordinating social reproduction and ecological imperatives to commodity production
and capital accumulation, thus offering pathways to undermine capitalism from within.
However, further research is necessary to refine this schema. This requires, in particular,
transdisciplinary approaches and innovative forms of participation to contextualise the
framework conditions and make sense of what people collectively value in their commu-
nities. As such, this article, essentially theoretical and tentative, provides a starting point
for an inter- and transdisciplinary research programme, including theoretical work and
empirical research across and beyond different scientific disciplines.
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